Root-cause regulation : protecting work and workers in the twenty-first century / Michael J. Piore and Andrew Schrank.

By: Piore, Michael J [author.]
Contributor(s): Schrank, Andrew [author.]
Language: English Publisher: Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England : Harvard University Press, 2018Description: 1 online resourceContent type: text Media type: unmediated Carrier type: volumeISBN: 9780674979604Subject(s): Labor laws and legislation | Labor inspection -- Law and legislationGenre/Form: Electronic books.DDC classification: 344.01 LOC classification: K1763 | .P56 2018Online resources: Full text available at Ebscohost Click here to view
Contents:
The United States -- France -- Spain -- Latin American variants -- Managing discretion -- Developing guidelines.
Summary: Why does the United States assign responsibility for different aspects of labor and employment law (e.g., wages and hours, safety and health, collective bargaining, discrimination, etc.) to different agencies, when France, Spain, and their former colonies assign all aspects of labor and employment law to a single agency? Does the US approach, which essentially reduces to "one inspector per law," perform better or worse than the "Latin" model, which implies "one inspector per firm?" And what are the implications for the division of labor in the public sector more generally? Root-Cause Regulation addresses these questions by comparing the evolution of labor market regulation in developed and developing countries over the course of the past century. The results speak not only to the protection of work and workers in the twenty-first century but to the organization of the public sector more generally.-- Provided by publisher
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 165-199) and index.

The United States -- France -- Spain -- Latin American variants -- Managing discretion -- Developing guidelines.

Why does the United States assign responsibility for different aspects of labor and employment law (e.g., wages and hours, safety and health, collective bargaining, discrimination, etc.) to different agencies, when France, Spain, and their former colonies assign all aspects of labor and employment law to a single agency? Does the US approach, which essentially reduces to "one inspector per law," perform better or worse than the "Latin" model, which implies "one inspector per firm?" And what are the implications for the division of labor in the public sector more generally? Root-Cause Regulation addresses these questions by comparing the evolution of labor market regulation in developed and developing countries over the course of the past century. The results speak not only to the protection of work and workers in the twenty-first century but to the organization of the public sector more generally.-- Provided by publisher

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