Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Urban economics / Arthur O'Sullivan.

By: O'Sullivan, Arthur [author]

Language: English Series: McGraw-Hill series in economicsPublisher: Boston : McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2009Edition: seventh editionDescription: xxix, 466 pages : illustration; 24 cmContent type: text Media type: unmediated Carrier type: volumeISBN: 9780073375786 (alk. paper); 0073375780 (alk. paper)Subject(s): Urban economicsDDC classification: 330.9173/2 LOC classification: HT321 | .O88 2009Online resources: Table of contents only

Contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction and Axioms of Urban Economics -- What Is Urban Economics? -- What Is a City? -- Why Do Cities Exist? -- The Five Axioms of Urban Economics -- 1. Prices Adjust to Achieve Locational Equilibrium -- 2. Self-Reinforcing Effects Generate Extreme Outcomes -- 3. Externalities Cause Inefficiency -- 4. Production Is Subject to Economies of Scale -- 5. Competition Generates Zero Economic Profit -- Appendix: Census Definitions -- Urban Population -- Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas -- Principal City -- Part I -- MARKET FORCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIES -- Chapter 2: Why Do Cities Exist? -- A Region Without Cities? Backyard Production -- A Trading City -- Comparative Advantage and Trade -- Scale Economies in Exchange -- Trading Cities in Urban History -- Trading Cities in World History -- Trading Cities in American History -- A Factory Town -- Determining Wages and Prices -- The Market Area of a Factory Town -- The Industrial Revolution and Factory Cities -- Innovations in Manufacturing -- Innovations in Transportation -- Innovations in Agriculture -- Energy Technology and Location Decisions -- A System of Factory Towns -- Materials-Oriented Firms and Processing Towns -- Scale Economies and Market Areas -- System of Processing Towns -- Other Examples of Materials-Oriented Industries -- Chapter 3: Why Do Firms Cluster? -- Sharing Intermediate Inputs -- Dresses and Buttons -- High-Technology Firms -- Sharing a Labor Pool -- The Isolated Firm -- Locating in a Cluster -- Expected Profits Are Higher in the Cluster -- Labor Matching -- A Model of Labor Matching -- Agglomeration Economies: More Workers Implies Better Matches -- Knowledge Spillovers -- Self-Reinforcing Effects Cause Industry Clusters -- The Cost of Clustering -- Benefits of Clustering -- Self-Reinforcing Effects -- Evidence of Localization Economies -- Urbanization Economies -- Sharing, Pooling, and Matching -- Corporate Headquarters and Functional Specialization -- Knowledge Spillovers -- Evidence of Urbanization Economies -- Other Benefits of Urban Size -- Joint Labor Supply. Chapter 4: City Size -- Utility and City Size -- Benefits and Costs of Bigger Cities -- Locational Equilibrium, Land Rent, and Utility within a City -- A System of Cities -- Cities Are Not Too Small -- Cities May Be Too Large -- Specialized and Diverse Cities -- A Model of Laboratory Cities -- Example: The Radio Industry in New York -- Evidence of Laboratory Cities -- Differences in City Size -- Differences in Localization and Urbanization Economies -- Local Goods and City Size -- Local Employment Amplifies Size Differences -- The Size Distribution of Cities -- The Rank-Size Rule -- Urban Giants: The Puzzle of Large Primary Cities -- Chapter 5: Urban Growth -- Economic Growth: Increase in Per-Capita Income -- City-Specific Innovation and Income -- Regionwide Innovation and Economic Growth -- Human Capital and Economic Growth -- Urban Employment Growth -- Export versus Local Employment and the Multiplier -- The Labor Demand Curve -- The Labor Supply Curve -- Equilibrium Effects of Changes in Supply and Demand -- Public Policy and Equilibrium Employment -- Taxes and Firm Location Choices -- Public Services and Location Decisions -- Subsidies and Incentive Programs -- Professional Sports, Stadiums, and Jobs -- Environmental Quality and Employment -- Projecting Changes in Total Employment -- Who Benefits from Increased Employment? -- Who Gets the New Jobs? -- Effects on Real Income per Capita -- Appendix: The Regional Context of Urban Growth -- The Neoclassical Model -- Differences in Natural Advantage Cause Concentration -- A Decrease in Transport Costs Causes Regional Dispersion -- Regional Concentration and Dispersion in the U.S. -- Part II -- LAND RENT AND LAND USE PATTERNS -- Chapter 6: Urban Land Rent -- Introduction to Land Rent -- Bid-Rent Curves for the Manufacturing Sector -- Bid-Rent Curves for the Information Sector -- Travel for Information Exchange -- Office Bid-Rent Curve with a Fixed Lot Size -- Office Bid-Rent Curves with Factor Substitution -- Building Options: The Office Isoquant -- Factor Substitution: Choosing a Building Height -- Factor Substitution Generates a Convex Bid-Rent Curve -- Housing Prices -- Linear Housing-Price Curve: No Consumer Substitution Consumer Substitution Generates a Convex Housing- Price Curve -- The Residential Bid-Rent Curve -- Fixed Factor Proportions -- Factor Substitution -- Residential Density -- Relaxing the Assumptions: Time Costs, Public Services, Taxes, Amenities -- Land-Use Patterns -- Bid-Rent Curves for Business -- Territories of Different Sectors -- Appendix: Consumer and Factor Substitution -- Consumer Choice and the Law of Demand -- Maximizing Utility: MRS Price Ratio -- Consumer Substitution -- Locational Equilibrium -- Input Choice and Factor Substitution -- Chapter 7: Land-Use Patterns -- The Spatial Distribution of Jobs and People -- The Spatial Distribution of Employment -- The Distribution of Office Space -- The Spatial Distribution of Population -- Commuting Patterns -- A Closer Look at Subcenters -- Subcenters in Los Angeles and Chicago -- Edge Cities -- Subcenters and City Centers -- Urban Density -- Densities of World Cities -- Density Gradients -- The Rise of the Monocentric City -- Innovations in Intracity Transportation -- The Technology of Building Construction -- The Primitive Technology of Freight -- The Demise of the Monocentric City -- Decentralization of Manufacturing: Trucks and Highways -- Other Factors: Automobiles, Single-Story Plants, and Airports -- Decentralization of Office Employment -- Decentralization of Population -- Urban Sprawl -- Sprawl Facts -- The Causes of Sprawl -- European Policies -- The Consequences of Sprawl -- Policy Responses to Sprawl? -- Appendix: The Monocentric Model and Applications -- The Monocentric Model -- Income and Location -- Trade-off between Commuting and Housing Costs -- A General Equilibrium Model of a Monocentric City -- Interactions between the Land and Labor Markets -- The General-Equilibrium Effects of the Streetcar -- Applying the Concepts -- Chapter 8 Neighborhood Choice -- Diversity versus Segregation -- Sorting for Local Public Goods -- Diversity in Demand for Local Public Goods -- Problems with Majority Rule and Formation of Municipalities -- Variation in Consumption of the Taxed Good -- Neighborhood Externalities -- Neighborhood Choice -- Segregation Equilibrium -- Integration as a Stable Equilibrium -- Mixed Neighborhoods -- Lot Size and Public Policy -- Minimum Lot Size Zoning and Segregation -- Schools and Neighborhood Choice -- Educational Achievement and Attainment across Neighborhoods -- The Education Production Function -- Education Production and Neighborhood Choice -- Crime and Neighborhood Choice -- Racial Segregation -- Racial Preferences and Neighborhood Choice -- Other Reasons for Racial Segregation -- Consequences of Segregation -- The Spatial Mismatch -- Schools and the Poverty Trap -- Racial Segregation Increases Poverty. Chapter 9: Zoning and Growth Controls -- Land-Use Zoning -- The Early History of Zoning -- Zoning as Environmental Policy? -- Fiscal Zoning -- Minimum Lot Zoning and the Space Externality -- Provision of Open Space -- The Legal Environment of Zoning -- Substantive Due Process -- Equal Protection -- Just Compensation -- A City Without Zoning? -- Growth Control: Urban Growth Boundaries -- Precise Growth Control: Limiting Land Area and Lot Size -- Winners and Losers from Growth Boundaries -- Urban Growth Boundary and Density -- Portland's Urban Growth Boundary -- Municipal versus Metropolitan Growth Boundaries -- 199 Trade-Offs with Growth Boundaries and Open Space -- Other Growth-Control Policies -- Limiting Building Permits -- Development Fees -- Part III -- URBAN TRANSPORTATION -- Chapter 10: Externalities from Autos -- Congestion Externalities -- The Demand for Urban Travel -- The Private and Social Costs of Travel -- Equilibrium versus Optimum Traffic -- The Congestion Tax -- Benefits and Costs of the Congestion Tax -- Congestion Taxes and Urban Growth -- Practicalities of the Congestion Tax -- Peak versus Off-Peak Travel -- Estimates of Congestion Taxes -- Implementing the Congestion Tax -- Pricing HOT Lanes -- Alternatives to a Congestion Tax -- Gasoline Tax -- Subsidies for Transit -- Eliminating Parking Subsidies -- The Road Capacity Decision -- Interpreting the Spaghetti Cost Curves -- Widen the Road if Congestion Tax -- Revenue Exceeds the Cost -- Capacity Expansion and Latent Demand -- Who Pays for Roads? -- Autos and Air Pollution -- Internalizing the Externality -- A Gasoline Tax -- Greenhouse Gases and a Carbon Tax -- Motor Vehicle Accidents -- Vehicle Safety Policies: Bikers Beware -- Pay to Drive Policies -- Accidents and Congestion -- Automobiles and Poverty -- Chapter 11: Mass Transit -- Mass Transit Facts -- Variation in Ridership across Metropolitan Areas and Income -- Elasticities of Demand for Transit -- Choosing a Travel Mode: Commuter Choices -- An Example of Modal Choice -- The Role of Density -- Trade-offs in Transit Service -- High-Occupancy Vehicle Lanes and Busways -- Designing a Transit System -- Cost of the Auto System -- Cost of the Bus System and BART -- System Choice -- Light Rail -- Subsidies for Public Transit -- Justification for Transit Subsidies -- Reasons for Transit Deficits -- Deregulation: Contracting and Paratransit -- Contracting for Transit Services -- Paratransit -- The British Experience with Deregulation -- Transit and Land-Use Patterns -- Mass Transit and Poverty -- Part IV -- URBAN CRIME -- Chapter 12: Crime -- Crime Facts -- The Victims of Crime -- The Costs of Crime -- The Rational Criminal -- The Economics of Double Parking -- Expected Utility and the Decision to Commit Crime -- Preventing Crime -- Morality and Anguish Costs -- The Equilibrium Quantity of Crime -- Drawing the Supply Curve -- The Marginal-Benefit Curve and the Equilibrium Quantity of Crime -- Increasing the Certainty of Punishment -- Increasing the Severity of Punishment -- Legal Opportunities and Education -- Lawful Opportunities and Crime -- Education as Crime-Fighting Policy -- Applications: Big-City Crime and the Crime Drop -- Why Are Crime Rates Higher in Big Cities? -- Why Did Crime Rates Decrease in the 1990's? -- How Much Crime? -- The Optimal Amount of Crime -- Crime Substitution and the Principle of Marginal Deterrence -- The Role of Prisons -- Incapacitation -- Rehabilitation -- Part V -- HOUSING. Chapter 13: Why Is Housing Different? -- Heterogeneity and Hedonics -- Durability, Deterioration, and Maintenance -- Picking the Quality Level -- Changes in Quality and Retirement -- Abandonment and Public Policy -- Durability and Supply Elasticity -- Moving Costs and Consumer Disequilibrium -- The Filtering Model of the Housing Market -- Filtering and the Housing Stepladder -- Subsidies for New Housing -- The Effects of Growth Controls -- Filtering with Rising Income -- The Price Effects of Growth Controls -- Chapter 14: Housing Policy -- Public Housing -- Public Housing and Recipient Welfare -- Subsidies for Private Housing -- Low Income Housing Tax Credit -- The Market Effects of Subsidized Housing -- Housing Vouchers -- Vouchers and Consumer Welfare -- Market Effects of Vouchers -- Portable Vouchers: Moving to Opportunity -- Community Development and Urban Renewal -- Urban Renewal -- Recent Community Development Programs -- Homelessness -- Which Housing Policy is Best? -- Subsidies for Mortgage Interest -- Mortgage Subsidy and Efficiency -- Mortgage Subsidy and Home Ownership -- Rent Control and Rent Regulation -- Part VI LOCAL GOVERNMENT -- Chapter 15: The Role of Local Government -- The Role of Local Government -- Local Public Goods: Equilibrium versus Optimum -- The Efficient Quantity of Local Public Goods -- The Median Voter Picks the Equilibrium Quantity -- Tiebout Model: Voting with Feet -- Benefit Taxation -- Natural Monopoly -- Externalities -- Public Education Externalities and Vouchers -- Externalities from Public Safety Programs -- Federalism and Metropolitan Government -- A Closer Look at the Median Voter Result -- A Series of Budget Elections -- The Median Voter in a Representative Democracy -- Implications of the Median-Voter Rule -- Limitations of the Median-Voter Model -- Chapter 16: Local Government Revenue -- Who Pays the Residential Property Tax? -- The Land Portion of the Property Tax -- Structure Portion: A Partial Equilibrium Approach -- Structure Portion: A General-Equilibrium Approach -- Changing the Assumptions -- From Models to Reality -- What about Rental Property Owners and Homeowners? -- A Practical Guide for Policy Makers -- What about the Business Property Tax? -- The Tiebout Model and the Property Tax -- Limits on Property Taxes -- Intergovernmental Grants -- Lump-Sum Grants -- Matching Grants -- Summary: The Stimulative Effects of Grants -- Applications: Welfare and Education Grants -- Welfare Reform: Matching Grants to Lump-Sum Grants -- Intergovernmental Grants for Education -- Appendix: Tools of Microeconomics -- Index.

Summary: "The Seventh Edition of Urban Economics lies at the intersection of geography and economics. Dynamic maps, new to this edition, bring urban economic statistics alive for students. Highlights in the new edition include treatment of: why cities exist and what causes them to grow or shrink; the market forces that shape cities and the role of; government in the urban economy; the urban transportation system; the causes of urban crime and its spatial consequences; and the unique features of the housing market and the effects of government housing policies."--Jacket.

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Item type	Current location	Home library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
BOOK	COLLEGE LIBRARY	COLLEGE LIBRARY SUBJECT REFERENCE	330.91732 Os8 2009 (Browse shelf)	c.1	Available		CITU-CL-43091
BOOK	COLLEGE LIBRARY	COLLEGE LIBRARY SUBJECT REFERENCE	330.91732 Os8 2009 (Browse shelf)	c.2	Available		CITU-CL-44432

Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Axioms of Urban Economics --
What Is Urban Economics? --
What Is a City? --
Why Do Cities Exist? --
The Five Axioms of Urban Economics --
1. Prices Adjust to Achieve Locational Equilibrium --
2. Self-Reinforcing Effects Generate Extreme Outcomes --
3. Externalities Cause Inefficiency --
4. Production Is Subject to Economies of Scale --
5. Competition Generates Zero Economic Profit --
Appendix: Census Definitions --
Urban Population --
Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas --
Principal City --
Part I --
MARKET FORCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIES --
Chapter 2: Why Do Cities Exist? --
A Region Without Cities? Backyard Production --
A Trading City --
Comparative Advantage and Trade --
Scale Economies in Exchange --
Trading Cities in Urban History --
Trading Cities in World History --
Trading Cities in American History --
A Factory Town --
Determining Wages and Prices --
The Market Area of a Factory Town --
The Industrial Revolution and Factory Cities --
Innovations in Manufacturing --
Innovations in Transportation --
Innovations in Agriculture --
Energy Technology and Location Decisions --
A System of Factory Towns --
Materials-Oriented Firms and Processing Towns --
Scale Economies and Market Areas --
System of Processing Towns --
Other Examples of Materials-Oriented Industries --
Chapter 3: Why Do Firms Cluster? --
Sharing Intermediate Inputs --
Dresses and Buttons --
High-Technology Firms --
Sharing a Labor Pool --
The Isolated Firm --
Locating in a Cluster --
Expected Profits Are Higher in the Cluster --
Labor Matching --
A Model of Labor Matching --
Agglomeration Economies: More Workers Implies Better Matches --
Knowledge Spillovers --
Self-Reinforcing Effects Cause Industry Clusters --
The Cost of Clustering --
Benefits of Clustering --
Self-Reinforcing Effects --
Evidence of Localization Economies --
Urbanization Economies --
Sharing, Pooling, and Matching --
Corporate Headquarters and Functional Specialization --
Knowledge Spillovers --
Evidence of Urbanization Economies --
Other Benefits of Urban Size --
Joint Labor Supply. Chapter 4: City Size --
Utility and City Size --
Benefits and Costs of Bigger Cities --
Locational Equilibrium, Land Rent, and Utility within a City --
A System of Cities --
Cities Are Not Too Small --
Cities May Be Too Large --
Specialized and Diverse Cities --
A Model of Laboratory Cities --
Example: The Radio Industry in New York --
Evidence of Laboratory Cities --
Differences in City Size --
Differences in Localization and Urbanization Economies --
Local Goods and City Size --
Local Employment Amplifies Size Differences --
The Size Distribution of Cities --
The Rank-Size Rule --
Urban Giants: The Puzzle of Large Primary Cities --
Chapter 5: Urban Growth --
Economic Growth: Increase in Per-Capita Income --
City-Specific Innovation and Income --
Regionwide Innovation and Economic Growth --
Human Capital and Economic Growth --
Urban Employment Growth --
Export versus Local Employment and the Multiplier --
The Labor Demand Curve --
The Labor Supply Curve --
Equilibrium Effects of Changes in Supply and Demand --
Public Policy and Equilibrium Employment --
Taxes and Firm Location Choices --
Public Services and Location Decisions --
Subsidies and Incentive Programs --
Professional Sports, Stadiums, and Jobs --
Environmental Quality and Employment --
Projecting Changes in Total Employment --
Who Benefits from Increased Employment? --
Who Gets the New Jobs? --
Effects on Real Income per Capita --
Appendix: The Regional Context of Urban Growth --
The Neoclassical Model --
Differences in Natural Advantage Cause Concentration --
A Decrease in Transport Costs Causes Regional Dispersion --
Regional Concentration and Dispersion in the U.S. --
Part II --
LAND RENT AND LAND USE PATTERNS --
Chapter 6: Urban Land Rent --
Introduction to Land Rent --
Bid-Rent Curves for the Manufacturing Sector --
Bid-Rent Curves for the Information Sector --
Travel for Information Exchange --
Office Bid-Rent Curve with a Fixed Lot Size --
Office Bid-Rent Curves with Factor Substitution --
Building Options: The Office Isoquant --
Factor Substitution: Choosing a Building Height --
Factor Substitution Generates a Convex Bid-Rent Curve --
Housing Prices --
Linear Housing-Price Curve: No Consumer Substitution Consumer Substitution Generates a Convex Housing- Price Curve --
The Residential Bid-Rent Curve --
Fixed Factor Proportions --
Factor Substitution --
Residential Density --
Relaxing the Assumptions: Time Costs, Public Services, Taxes, Amenities --
Land-Use Patterns --
Bid-Rent Curves for Business --
Territories of Different Sectors --
Appendix: Consumer and Factor Substitution --
Consumer Choice and the Law of Demand --
Maximizing Utility: MRS Price Ratio --
Consumer Substitution --
Locational Equilibrium --
Input Choice and Factor Substitution --
Chapter 7: Land-Use Patterns --
The Spatial Distribution of Jobs and People --
The Spatial Distribution of Employment --
The Distribution of Office Space --
The Spatial Distribution of Population --
Commuting Patterns --
A Closer Look at Subcenters --
Subcenters in Los Angeles and Chicago --
Edge Cities --
Subcenters and City Centers --
Urban Density --
Densities of World Cities --
Density Gradients --
The Rise of the Monocentric City --
Innovations in Intracity Transportation --
The Technology of Building Construction --
The Primitive Technology of Freight --
The Demise of the Monocentric City --
Decentralization of Manufacturing: Trucks and Highways --
Other Factors: Automobiles, Single-Story Plants, and Airports --
Decentralization of Office Employment --
Decentralization of Population --
Urban Sprawl --
Sprawl Facts --
The Causes of Sprawl --
European Policies --
The Consequences of Sprawl --
Policy Responses to Sprawl? --
Appendix: The Monocentric Model and Applications --
The Monocentric Model --
Income and Location --
Trade-off between Commuting and Housing Costs --
A General Equilibrium Model of a Monocentric City --
Interactions between the Land and Labor Markets --
The General-Equilibrium Effects of the Streetcar --
Applying the Concepts --
Chapter 8 Neighborhood Choice --
Diversity versus Segregation --
Sorting for Local Public Goods --
Diversity in Demand for Local Public Goods --
Problems with Majority Rule and Formation of Municipalities --
Variation in Consumption of the Taxed Good --
Neighborhood Externalities --
Neighborhood Choice --
Segregation Equilibrium --
Integration as a Stable Equilibrium --
Mixed Neighborhoods --
Lot Size and Public Policy --
Minimum Lot Size Zoning and Segregation --
Schools and Neighborhood Choice --
Educational Achievement and Attainment across Neighborhoods --
The Education Production Function --
Education Production and Neighborhood Choice --
Crime and Neighborhood Choice --
Racial Segregation --
Racial Preferences and Neighborhood Choice --
Other Reasons for Racial Segregation --
Consequences of Segregation --
The Spatial Mismatch --
Schools and the Poverty Trap --
Racial Segregation Increases Poverty. Chapter 9: Zoning and Growth Controls --
Land-Use Zoning --
The Early History of Zoning --
Zoning as Environmental Policy? --
Fiscal Zoning --
Minimum Lot Zoning and the Space Externality --
Provision of Open Space --
The Legal Environment of Zoning --
Substantive Due Process --
Equal Protection --
Just Compensation --
A City Without Zoning? --
Growth Control: Urban Growth Boundaries --
Precise Growth Control: Limiting Land Area and Lot Size --
Winners and Losers from Growth Boundaries --
Urban Growth Boundary and Density --
Portland's Urban Growth Boundary --
Municipal versus Metropolitan Growth Boundaries --
199 Trade-Offs with Growth Boundaries and Open Space --
Other Growth-Control Policies --
Limiting Building Permits --
Development Fees --
Part III --
URBAN TRANSPORTATION --
Chapter 10: Externalities from Autos --
Congestion Externalities --
The Demand for Urban Travel --
The Private and Social Costs of Travel --
Equilibrium versus Optimum Traffic --
The Congestion Tax --
Benefits and Costs of the Congestion Tax --
Congestion Taxes and Urban Growth --
Practicalities of the Congestion Tax --
Peak versus Off-Peak Travel --
Estimates of Congestion Taxes --
Implementing the Congestion Tax --
Pricing HOT Lanes --
Alternatives to a Congestion Tax --
Gasoline Tax --
Subsidies for Transit --
Eliminating Parking Subsidies --
The Road Capacity Decision --
Interpreting the Spaghetti Cost Curves --
Widen the Road if Congestion Tax --
Revenue Exceeds the Cost --
Capacity Expansion and Latent Demand --
Who Pays for Roads? --
Autos and Air Pollution --
Internalizing the Externality --
A Gasoline Tax --
Greenhouse Gases and a Carbon Tax --
Motor Vehicle Accidents --
Vehicle Safety Policies: Bikers Beware --
Pay to Drive Policies --
Accidents and Congestion --
Automobiles and Poverty --
Chapter 11: Mass Transit --
Mass Transit Facts --
Variation in Ridership across Metropolitan Areas and Income --
Elasticities of Demand for Transit --
Choosing a Travel Mode: Commuter Choices --
An Example of Modal Choice --
The Role of Density --
Trade-offs in Transit Service --
High-Occupancy Vehicle Lanes and Busways --
Designing a Transit System --
Cost of the Auto System --
Cost of the Bus System and BART --
System Choice --
Light Rail --
Subsidies for Public Transit --
Justification for Transit Subsidies --
Reasons for Transit Deficits --
Deregulation: Contracting and Paratransit --
Contracting for Transit Services --
Paratransit --
The British Experience with Deregulation --
Transit and Land-Use Patterns --
Mass Transit and Poverty --
Part IV --
URBAN CRIME --
Chapter 12: Crime --
Crime Facts --
The Victims of Crime --
The Costs of Crime --
The Rational Criminal --
The Economics of Double Parking --
Expected Utility and the Decision to Commit Crime --
Preventing Crime --
Morality and Anguish Costs --
The Equilibrium Quantity of Crime --
Drawing the Supply Curve --
The Marginal-Benefit Curve and the Equilibrium Quantity of Crime --
Increasing the Certainty of Punishment --
Increasing the Severity of Punishment --
Legal Opportunities and Education --
Lawful Opportunities and Crime --
Education as Crime-Fighting Policy --
Applications: Big-City Crime and the Crime Drop --
Why Are Crime Rates Higher in Big Cities? --
Why Did Crime Rates Decrease in the 1990's? --
How Much Crime? --
The Optimal Amount of Crime --
Crime Substitution and the Principle of Marginal Deterrence --
The Role of Prisons --
Incapacitation --
Rehabilitation --
Part V --
HOUSING. Chapter 13: Why Is Housing Different? --
Heterogeneity and Hedonics --
Durability, Deterioration, and Maintenance --
Picking the Quality Level --
Changes in Quality and Retirement --
Abandonment and Public Policy --
Durability and Supply Elasticity --
Moving Costs and Consumer Disequilibrium --
The Filtering Model of the Housing Market --
Filtering and the Housing Stepladder --
Subsidies for New Housing --
The Effects of Growth Controls --
Filtering with Rising Income --
The Price Effects of Growth Controls --
Chapter 14: Housing Policy --
Public Housing --
Public Housing and Recipient Welfare --
Subsidies for Private Housing --
Low Income Housing Tax Credit --
The Market Effects of Subsidized Housing --
Housing Vouchers --
Vouchers and Consumer Welfare --
Market Effects of Vouchers --
Portable Vouchers: Moving to Opportunity --
Community Development and Urban Renewal --
Urban Renewal --
Recent Community Development Programs --
Homelessness --
Which Housing Policy is Best? --
Subsidies for Mortgage Interest --
Mortgage Subsidy and Efficiency --
Mortgage Subsidy and Home Ownership --
Rent Control and Rent Regulation --
Part VI LOCAL GOVERNMENT --
Chapter 15: The Role of Local Government --
The Role of Local Government --
Local Public Goods: Equilibrium versus Optimum --
The Efficient Quantity of Local Public Goods --
The Median Voter Picks the Equilibrium Quantity --
Tiebout Model: Voting with Feet --
Benefit Taxation --
Natural Monopoly --
Externalities --
Public Education Externalities and Vouchers --
Externalities from Public Safety Programs --
Federalism and Metropolitan Government --
A Closer Look at the Median Voter Result --
A Series of Budget Elections --
The Median Voter in a Representative Democracy --
Implications of the Median-Voter Rule --
Limitations of the Median-Voter Model --
Chapter 16: Local Government Revenue --
Who Pays the Residential Property Tax? --
The Land Portion of the Property Tax --
Structure Portion: A Partial Equilibrium Approach --
Structure Portion: A General-Equilibrium Approach --
Changing the Assumptions --
From Models to Reality --
What about Rental Property Owners and Homeowners? --
A Practical Guide for Policy Makers --
What about the Business Property Tax? --
The Tiebout Model and the Property Tax --
Limits on Property Taxes --
Intergovernmental Grants --
Lump-Sum Grants --
Matching Grants --
Summary: The Stimulative Effects of Grants --
Applications: Welfare and Education Grants --
Welfare Reform: Matching Grants to Lump-Sum Grants --
Intergovernmental Grants for Education --
Appendix: Tools of Microeconomics --
Index.

"The Seventh Edition of Urban Economics lies at the intersection of geography and economics. Dynamic maps, new to this edition, bring urban economic statistics alive for students. Highlights in the new edition include treatment of: why cities exist and what causes them to grow or shrink; the market forces that shape cities and the role of; government in the urban economy; the urban transportation system; the causes of urban crime and its spatial consequences; and the unique features of the housing market and the effects of government housing policies."--Jacket.

300-399

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